The Viewpoint article expressed the feelings of unease often encountered at the display of human corpses in museums, whether relating to prehistoric or recent times. The reasons frequently stem from what is seen as a lack of respect for the remains of another human being. In this instance, the underlying concerns are that the corpses are displayed naked, along with lack of consent from anyone with an interest in them. While these are legitimate queries, ethical interests extend further afield to (...) include whether the corpses are identifiable, are prehistoric or recent, and the existence of living descendants. Additional interests include the uses to which corpses are put, namely, research, teaching and/or public displays.In recent years, it has become commonplace to hear of human remains that had been held for many years by universities or museums being repatriated to indigenous people groups in America, Australia and New Zealand for subsequent reburial.1 ,2 However, the debate regarding the ethical uses to which dead bodies may be put has taken a surprising turn in recent years with the extremely popular, highly publicised, public displays of dissected and plastinated whole body cadavers.3Over the years, most people have had few misgivings looking at the remains of prehistoric individuals, or Egyptian mummies.i Attitudes towards viewing mummies have been shaped by the perception that prehistoric remains are located outside our immediate social relationships, and so, have often been considered as anatomical objects rather than the remains of people-now-dead. In other words, their anonymity appears to protect both the corpses …. (shrink)

Accounts from the humanities which focus on describing the nature of whole body plastinates are examined. We argue that this literature shows that plastinates do not clearly occupy standard cultural binary categories of interior or exterior, real or fake, dead or alive, bodies or persons, self or other and argue that Noël Carroll’s structural framework for horrific monsters unites the various accounts of the contradictory or ambiguous nature of plastinates while also showing how plastinates differ from horrific fictional monsters. In (...) doing so, it offers an account of the varied reactions of those responding to exhibitions of plastinated whole bodies. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is Andrej Ule’s book Osnovna filozofska vprašanja sodobne logike [Basic Philosophical Questions of Contemporary Logic] from 1982. Specifically, I focus on his assessment of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein’s views on the ontological status of logic and its apriority. Ule claims that all three thinkers failed because they did not take into account the role a human being plays in this as the creator of language. In this assessment, I recognize the rejection of metaphysics and (...) the linguistic approach to philosophical issues that were characteristic of analytic philosophy in the past. I shortly describe this position and the role that the discussed authors played in its development. I conclude with my own assessment of the proposed views based on the contemporary, metaphysics-friendly position. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Hawthorne'€™s contextualist solution to Benacerraf'€™s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but (...) this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne'€™s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge. (shrink)

SAŽETAK: Empiristi su tvrdili da se medicinsko znanje u cjelini može steći na temelju iskustva i da za njegovo formiranje i primjenu nije potrebna nikakva teorija. Ključni dio toga stava sastoji se u odbacivanju istraživanja uzroka bolesti. Medicinsko se znanje sastoji od teorema koji su generalizacije izvedene na temelju iskustva. Ranije analize generalizacija kojima se služi medicina, kao i rasprave o stručnom znanju općenito, pokazuju da je među grčkim liječnicima i filozofima bio prihvaćen stav da ispravne generalizacije koje nekoj djelatnosti (...) jamče status umijeća jesu eksplanatorne generalizacije – takve koje uključuju poznavanje uzroka. U članku istražujem na temelju čega empiristi mogu za neeksplanatorne generalizacije zahtijevati isti status i nastojim pokazati da je njihov argument u osnovi taj da statistički kriterij formulacije takvih generalizacija jamči njihovo podudaranje s događajima koje opisuju, što eksplanatornegeneralizacije ne mogu osigurati.The Empiricists argued that medical knowledge is a matter of experience, and that no theory is required either for its formation or application. The central part of their position was rejecting the possibility of the discovery of causal connections by the use of reason. The theorems that make up medical knowledge are empirical generalizations that do not include the specification of the cause. However, the Greek authors outside Empiricism, both medical and philosophical, made a strong case for the claim that a generalization must be explanatory to be scientific or artistic. In this paper I discuss how non-explanatory generalizations, being statements of frequency of joint occurrences which are statistically accurate, can be taken by the Empiricists as scientific. (shrink)

Istraživanjima vezanim uz vrednovanje znanstvenog rada u području filozofije na svjetskoj razini bavilo se vrlo malo autora. Zbog specifičnosti ove discipline, scientometrijski istraživati filozofiju unutar humanistike može biti komparativno interesantno, ali ona u ovim istraživanjima svakako zaslužuje posebno mjesto. U ovom radu pokušali smo dobiti uvid u potencijalnu vidljivost hrvatskih filozofskih časopisa indeksiranošću u bazi podataka The Philosopher’s Index i mjerenjem odjeka članaka kroz citiranost u Social Science Citation Index i Arts & Humanities Citation Index . Citatnom analizom nastojali smo (...) dobiti uvid u komunikacijske odnose hrvatskih filozofskih časopisa. Jedan od osnovnih zaključaka je da u vrednovanju znanstvenog rada u filozofiji, ISI-jeve citatne baze nemaju isti značaj kao za područje prirodnih znanosti ili biomedicine. Očekuje se da će znatno relevantniji instrumentarij u vrednovanju znanstvenog rada u području filozofije biti baza podataka ERIH .Few authors worldwide have conducted some research on the evaluation of scientific work in the field of philosophy. Due to specificity of this discipline, scientometric research of philosophy inside the humanities can be comparatively interesting, but philosophy should have a special position in this research. In this paper we have tried to get an insight into the potential visibility of Croatian philosophy journals indexed by The Philosopher’s Index, and by measuring their impact through citations by Social Science Citation Index and Arts & Humanities Citation Index . Using citation analysis, we have tried to establish the communication relationship between Croatian and other philosophy journals worldwide and to determine significance of Croatian philosophy journals. One of our main conclusions is that the evaluation of scientific work in philosophy by ISI citation databases does not have the same importance as it has in the field of science or biomedicine. Furtheremore, database ERIH is expected to become more relevant instrument in the evaluation of scientific work in the field of philosophy. (shrink)

Filozofowie umysłu zaczynają odgrywać istotną rolę w debacie na temat statusu moralnego zwierząt. Współczesne, obiecujące koncepcje świadomości każą uznać, że zwierzęta nie są zdolne do cierpienia w ludzkim sensie, co budzi sprzeciw wielu badaczy troszczących się o los zwierząt. Ponadto, etycy uznający zdolność do cierpienia za podstawowe kryterium przyznawania statusu moralnego, są w kłopocie, gdyż wyniki nauk kognitywnych wydają się kłócić z ich intuicjami. Proponuję usunąć ten problem przez odrzucenie poglądu uznającego konieczny związek między posiadaniem statusu moralnego a zdolnością do (...) cierpienia. Przedstawiam również projekt, jak bronić zasadności przynajmniej niektórych intuicji opartych na empatii i korzystać z nich w debacie na temat statusu moralnego zwierząt. (shrink)

In Describing Inner Experience, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel explore the proper limits of scepticism about consciousness and the prospect of a scientific investigation of consciousness. Their debate with each other focuses on the question about whether we can trust people's reports about their inner experiences and on Hurlburt's introspective method, DES. I point out that their discussion leaves unclear the crucial question of the aims and objectives of DES. This makes it difficult genuinely to assess DES's merits and the problems for (...) theorizing that might be created by inaccuracy in the introspective data. I then provide a taxonomy of different introspective methods, depending on different roles played by introspective data and on the kinds of questions that are being asked. I suggest that introspective methods tasked to answer a certain group of questions -- certain philosophical questions about experience -- are more vulnerable to the possibility of introspective error than others. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the theoretical philosophy of Bukharin as developed in his book Filosofskie arabeski. I analyze three concepts—perception, being, and dialectics—and show that and how they deviate from the meaning that they commonly have among other Russian Marxists. In this work, Bukharin drafts a theory that can be interpreted as a “relational ontology,” since it focuses on the relations between entities and since these relations are considered to be more fundamental than the entities themselves and provide epistemic access (...) to reality. My examination of Bukharin’s theoretical views shows that he continues Lenin’s tradition of materialist and dialectical thought. That is why, in spite of his innovative approach to some key problems of theoretical philosophy, Bukharin did not go far enough in his studies. His theoretical position appears to be an integral part of his political engagement. (shrink)

Tekst stanowi recenzję książki Joanny Erbel pt. Wychylone w przyszłość. Jak zmienić świat na lepsze. W recenzji omówiona zostaje kluczowa dla książki koncepcja protopii, która oznacza proces stopniowego ulepszania rzeczywistości. Przywoływane przez Erbel przykłady skutecznych rozwiązań przeanalizowane są w kontekście kategorii lokalności i ucieleśnienia. Przedstawiona zostaje krytyka koncepcji innowacji opartej na rozwiązaniach instytucjonalnych, zaawansowanych technologicznie i wymagających dużych nakładów finansowych.

This paper is a critical commentary on Walter Veit’s book "A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness." My goal is to show that although Veit succeeds in presenting a compelling account of animal consciousness, he may have unintentionally undermined the purpose of such science. I argue that, despite the author’s claims, his theory is not as empirically grounded as he makes it out to be. Paradoxically, some of Veit’s arguments against his opponents seem to be double-edged. Still, I also (...) argue that this is a necessary cost, as an alternative would be to succumb to a particular form of metatheoretical anthropomorphism. In effect, we end up with a surprising conclusion that we need many sciences of different consciousnesses, which seems at odds with Veit’s Darwinian continuity assumption. However, this only goes to show that the book is well worth discussing. (shrink)

McCullough et al 1 confront a challenge that no organisation has fully eradicated: incivility. They emphasise that civility is not merely a matter of common decency and good conduct but also a moral imperative, an aspirational value that should be promoted and modelled by all the members of the institutions and throughout all the stages of practitioners’ careers. In their fusion of ancient wisdom and philosophical classics with their own insights on contemporary workplaces, they forward a defensible case for why (...) civility matters and is worthy of continuous contemplation. Given the clarity and persuasion of their piece, I do not seek to challenge their claims. Instead, I will complement their argument with a perspective highlighting the difficulties of identifying low-level workplace mistreatments and responding to them impartially. While organisations should certainly not skimp on their efforts to promote civility and hold their transgressors accountable, there are nonetheless boundaries to good intentions.2 The unexamined pursuit of civility, if characterised by inconsistent definitions of harm and inappropriate allegations of uncivil acts, runs the risk of fostering its own toxicity spirals. With the hope of contributing to the exchange initiated by McCullough and colleagues, I briefly highlight …. (shrink)

Pravo na privatnost složen je koncept koji je prolazio svoje povijesne i društvene promjene. Premda je ponekad značio depriviranost i neravnopravnost, ipak mu se priznavala važnost za slobodu, demokraciju, autonomiju i razvoj pojedinca. S umreženim društvom pojavili su se novi aspekti problema privatnosti i socijalne uključenosti koji zahtijevaju njihova nova, kritička promišljanja u svjetlu različitih društvenih vrijednosti i tehnologijskog konteksta.Right to privacy is a complex concept with historical and social changes of its own. Although sometimes it was connected with deprivation (...) and inequality, today it is usually conceived as a condition for freedom, democracy, autonomy and self-development. The network society brought new aspects of the problem of privacy and social inclusion that demand their new, critical rethinking in the light of different social values and new technology context. (shrink)

L?acte constitutif de l?histoire culturelle contemporaine?tait la coupure avec les presuppositions?pist?mologiques et m?thodologiques de l?histoire?conomique et sociale. Le champ nouveau de l?historiographie, rompant avec?la tradition historiographique?, s?est fond? sur le nouveau?mat?rialisme? et sur la th?orie de la r?pr?sentation. Une question inqui?tante cepandant s?impose: dans quelle mesure les conceptualisations et les m?thodologies de l?histoire contemporaine ne sont que costumes nouveaux pour vieux engagements de l?histoire? Le mat?rialisme nouveau ne d?guise-t-il pas la vieille pratique des historiens de rassembler des?faits?? La th?orie de (...) la r?pr?sentation ne d?guise-t-elle pas l?id?e des m?ntalit?s? Si la r?ponse est affirmatif, il faut poser une nouvelle question: Les grandes luttes dans le champ de l?histoire ne sont-elles pas des strat?gies d?oubli qui essaient d?effacer la m?moire de l?historiographie recente et de ses effets cognitifs? Konstitutivni cin za savremenu kulturnu istoriju bio je raskid sa epistemoloskim i metodoloskim pretpostavkama ekonomske i socijalne istorije. Novo polje istoriografije, raskidajuci sa?tradicionalnom istoriografijom?, pronaslo je oslonac u?novom materijalizmu? i teoriji reprezentacije. Namece se, medjutim, jedno pitanje koje stvara zabrinutost: u kojoj meri su konceptulizacije i metodologije savremene istorije samo novo ruho starih zaloga istorije? Ne krije li novi materijalizam stare prakse istoricara da prikupljaju?c?injenice?? Ne krije li teorija reprezentacije ideju mentaliteta? Ukoliko je odgovor potvrdan, treba postaviti novo pitanje: nisu li velike borbe koje se odvijaju u polju istorije strategije zaborava kojima se pokusava izbrisati secanje na skorasnju istoriografiju i posledice koje je ona imala po spoznaju? (shrink)

Focused on the notion of the threshold of objectivity, my article dissects the empirical mirror-glass of the philosophy of Joseph Melançon. I propose to thrust this emblematic perspective of determinist discourse against the literary turn, acclaimed for its underpinning ambiguous subjectivity – here notably made relevant by Pierre Bourdieu. Both discursive practices complete each other and reject each other in a self-feeding spiral: incessant motivation for a hybrid, vexing study of mutual tensions.

In this paper, I argue that the distinction between standard and non-standard pragmatic implications, originally used to differentiate among types of conversational implicatures, applies to the family of contents—traditionally referred to as ‘presuppositions’—that exhibit projective behaviour. Following the scholars working within the Question Under Discussion model of communication, I distinguish between two types of projective implications: suppositions and presuppositions narrowly construed. Next, I identify two rules of appropriateness that govern the use of, respectively, supposition-triggering and presupposition-triggering expressions. Finally, I argue (...) that the ostentatious violation of the rules in question gives rise to non-standard projective implications, whereas their observance results in standard suppositions and presuppositions; I also use the idea of discourse coherence to develop a sketchy account of the mechanisms underlying the functioning of non-standard projective implications. (shrink)

Članek obravnava korejsko in japonsko filozofijo v luči njunih filozofskih tradicij in ob prihodu filozofije kot znanosti, kot so jo razvijali v Evropi. Med pomembnimi korejskimi filozofi sta predstavljena Yi I in Yi Hwang. Slednji predvsem zaradi vpliva njegove filozofije Najvišjega Poslednjega in problematizacije neizrekljivega na področju psihofizičnega zavedanja, ki ostaja centralna točka azijskih filozofij. Od začetkov japonske filozofije prehaja članek na skupino tako imenovanih duhovnih intelektualcev, postmoderne filozofije in na teorije kultivacije telesa-duha Yuasa Yasua.

Conventionalists about modality deny that the world has a modal structure. Metaphysical necessity is not a real feature of the world, but a linguistic necessity grounded in conventions governing our use of words. In this paper, I focus on Allan Sidelle’s conventionalist account and especially on his claim that the idea of real necessity should be abandoned since it is puzzling. My strategy for the defense of the realist notion of modality is twofold. First, the ontology of undifferentiated stuff, which (...) underlies his conventionalist account, is itself very puzzling and in need of further defense. Second, the alleged problems of the realist interpretation are based on an empiricist view of the world. (shrink)

Since 1996, when David Chalmers introduced the zombie argument against physicalism in The Conscious Mind, numerous works of ever-increasing technical complexity and nuanced argumentation have been written on the conceivability and possibility of zombies. In this paper, I focus on the main points of the argument. First, I discuss the conceivability of zombies. I briefly outline three other thought-experiments in order to determine what is expected of a good thought-experiment and its workings. Next, I turn to Chalmers' defense of their (...) conceivability, where the key consideration is to present conceivability as a credible a priori method that can entail metaphysical possibility. I conclude that Chalmers does not manage to create a credible link between conceivability and possibility, thus failing to show that zombies are not only conceptually possible, but also metaphysically possible. The most problematic idea is the identification of logically possible worlds with metaphysically possible worlds. Chalmers' main aim is to defend conceivability as an a priori method of acquiring modal knowledge, but by limiting it to the rational domain, the acquired knowledge is not knowledge of the objective reality, but of the content of our thoughts. (shrink)

The question standing in the backgrounds of this paper is what kind of hermeneutics can emerge on basis of philosophy of life. To answer it, the theories of German philosophers Georg Misch and Josef Koenig have been analyzed. The first developed hermeneutical logics, which is based on identification the notions ‘life’ and ‘articulation’ ). Three aspects –life as logical category, life as hermeneutical category, and the discoursive forms of self-representation of life- extracted from Misch’s theory seem to be relevant for (...) further development of hermeneutics. Koenig carries forward this research program, but focuses on the linguistic structures of human perception experience and drafts a kind of analytical hermeneutics. The remarkable part of both conceptions is that they pose it logical heterogenity of theoretical and practical discourses. These differences are relevant for rethinking of such epistemological phenomenon, such as ‘meaning’, ‘concept’, ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. According to these positions, hermeneutics can be a homogenous theory of interpretation or understanding, but on the contrary the different logical areas of hermeneutics must be constituted. Thus, hermeneutics can be interpreted as an alternative to the traditional, i.e., epistemological approach, to the theory of knowledge, on the one hand, and to analytical philosophy of language on the other. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less (...) tractable than it might otherwise be. (shrink)

The bibliography of works discussing Russian Marxism is huge, making it very difficult to give an original interpretation of this phenomenon. To distinguish myself from the interpretative mainstream, I do not focus on persons and chronology, but rather investigate the question whether there was a specific logic in the unfolding of Russian Marxism which led to its consolidation into a specific doctrine, focusing on dialectical and historical materialism, during the Soviet period, and transformed it from a pluralistic philosophy into the (...) monolithic official ideology of the Russian Communist Party. I concentrate on some theoretical and epistemological problems discussed by Russian Marxists, such as whether dialectical materialism is a theory or a methodology, whether dialectics is a logical or ontological category, what the term “dialectical materialism” exactly means, and what the materialistic understanding of cognition and the core assumption of historical materialism are. Accordingly, my approach has a reconstructive character: I focus on some fundamental propositions of Soviet Marxism which are recorded in textbooks on philosophy and try to recover their philosophical genesis. Thus my scope is restricted to a selection of relevant discussion points, allowing me to keep the philosophical discussions separate from political controversies. (shrink)

Researchers of non-human animal emotions tend to defend some forms of anthropomorphism and seek ways to make it more critical, self-aware, and useful for scientific purposes. I propose that to achieve this goal, we need first to conduct a Kantian investigation into the deeper structure of anthropomorphism. I argue that we can distinguish at least three levels of anthropomorphising: a narrative level, a cognitive level and an in-between, metatheoretical level which is the deeper structure determining how we anthropomorphise. Because the (...) current debate tends to focus either on the narrative level or on the cognitive level, this paper concentrates on the metatheoretical level, discusses its role in emotion research, the possible errors it may cause, and how we can work on it, drawing on predictive processing-based theories of emotions and an evolutionary approach. The key to being critical in anthropomorphism is to be aware of the complexity of this whole structure, as well as to be able to challenge and put into question all and any of its elements. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine uses of introspection in present-day philosophy of perception. First, I introduce a distinction between two different meanings of the term ‘introspection’: introspective access and introspective method. I show that they are both at work in the philosophy of perception but not adequately distinguished. I then lay out some concerns about the use of introspection to collect data about consciousness that were raised in over a hundred years ago, by some early experimentalist psychologists, part of (...) so-called ‘Introspectionist Psychology’. As I argue, these concerns apply to current philosophical uses of introspection but they are not acknowledged, much less addressed. I explain this by applying the distinction between introspective access and introspective method. As a result, extant arguments relying on introspection-based phenomenal descriptions are methodologically problematic. These problems do not call into question the use of introspection in theorising altogether. But we need to take more care in how we use it. (shrink)

Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.

Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) put forward a map of a space of possible forms of introspection with the aim that (among other things) it can be used as a theoretical tool or framework to systematically compare and contrast different accounts of introspection. Using the distinction between phenomena (real-world systems), models, and modelling frameworks, I question whether such a map in the ambitious form proposed is feasible.

The bucket experiment in Newton’s Principia is quite simple. Nonetheless, physicists as well as philosophers and historians of science are still debating its purpose and success. I present two interpretations found in the literature. According to the first, Newton tries to prove absolute rotation and thus the existence of absolute space. According to the second, he tries to provide a definition of absolute rotation as it is used in his mechanics. Closely connected to this is his rejection of Descartes’ explanation (...) of rotation and of motion in general. I conclude with a short discussion on whether the bucket experiment can be classified as a thought experiment. (shrink)

The article analyzes the metaphor “Copernican revolution,” used by Kant to highlight the core idea of his philosophy. The author argues that Kant uses the analogies with mathematics and natural science for establishing criteria of scientific character of knowledge. These criteria include the hypothetic-deductive or a priorimethod of thinking, which determines the apodictic, i.e. necessary and objective, character of the basic laws of nature, as well as the verification of laws a priorithrough experiments.The author focuses on Kant’s idea of the (...) possibility of scientific metaphysics based on these criteria. She claims that the structure of scientific metaphysics and the epistemological status of its statements depend on what kind of objects it deals with: with phenomena given to us by sensuality, with only conceivable “things in themselves” or with supersensitive “objects of an idea.” In the last part, the author interprets the meaning of the metaphor “Copernican turn” as the upgrading of logic, the idea of “transcendental idealism” and discusses the possibility of using the metaphor “Ptolemaic system” to characterize the practical philosophy of Kant. (shrink)

The article focuses on a phenomenological study of political action. The analysis includes three directions: the concept of action, paradigms that determine political actions, and the purpose of action. In the analysis of action, I first use the distinction between the concepts of “act” and “operate.” “To act” means a conscious, deliberate, rational action. In contrast, “operate” means to behave unconsciously, mechanically or automatically, passively or instinctively. The political implications of the distinction between an “acting” and “operating” person can be (...) formulated in the terms “freedom of action” and “coercion to operate,” and the latter can be used as a criterion for determining the type of social system, as well as for evaluating the correlated psychological state of society. As the next step, I analyse the action as a process and a result. I argue that in the social sphere, action appears as the sum of these moments, and the social sphere is a derivate of action. The last aspect of the analysis of action is responsibility. I claim that responsibility can be interpreted as the awareness and recognition by the individual of her role in history. The second part of the work is the study of paradigms and rules of political action in so-called open and closed societies. I claim that political action within the framework of an open society is limited only by legislation. In a closed society, political action is practically impossible: citizens do not act, but “operate” since there are no conditions for actions. After that, I analyse the role of social myths as a factor affecting people’s political activities. In the last part, I analyse the ultimate goal of political action. Traditionally, political philosophy assumes that the goals of politics are exhausted by the problems of relationship between the state and the individual. However, based on the theory of Hannah Arendt, it is possible to formulate the task of political action as the achievement of humanism in a human being, taken not in her relation to the state but in relation to herself. I argue that the minimal political action that can be qualified as humanism consists of the ability and courage to use one’s own mind. (shrink)

Cilj ovoga istraživanja bio je ispitati povezanost između usredotočene svjesnosti u roditeljstvu, kognitivne roditeljske svjesnosti i subjektivne dobrobiti adolescenata. U istraživanju je sudjelovala 101 obitelj koju su činili majka, otac i dijete adolescentne dobi, u rasponu od 10 do 17 godina, i to 69 adolescentica i 32 adolescenta. Primijenjeni su upitnici općih podataka za adolescente i roditelje, upitnik usredotočene svjesnosti u roditeljstvu i upitnik kognitivne roditeljske svjesnosti, dok su adolescenti ispunili skale usamljenosti, zadovoljstva životom i obitelji te općeg samopoštovanja. Rezultati (...) su pokazali da su adolescenti zadovoljniji životom i iskazuju više samopoštovanje u odnosu na adolescentice. Također, utvrđena je značajna povezanost između majki i očeva u većini mjera roditeljstva. Rezultati upućuju na zaključak da su usredotočena svjesnost u roditeljstvu i kognitivna roditeljska svjesnost značajni korelati subjektivne dobrobiti adolescenata kada je riječ o očevima, no ne i majkama. (shrink)

The issue of the nature of cognitive experience has been a subject of lively debate in recent works on epistemology, and the philosophy of mind. During this debate, the relevance of Kant to contemporary theories of cognition has been re-discovered. However, participants in this debate disagree whether Kant was a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist, with regard to the character of intuitions. The central point of controversy concerns whether or not Kant’s sensible intuitions involve understanding and have a conceptual content. In (...) this paper, I show that, despite their disagreements, both sides share a number of common presuppositions, which have determined a biased framework for the reading of Kant. My principal aim in this article is to reconcile the case for conceptualism with those interpretations which argue that intentionality and conceptuality can be separated. To achieve it, I present my own reconstruction of Kant’s theory of cognition, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B-version of the Transcendental Deduction, and offer a new interpretation of Kantian conceptualism. (shrink)

Artykuł przedstawia Deborę Vogel jako jedną z najważniejszych krytyczek i teoretyczek sztuki lat trzydziestych XX wieku. Po polsku oraz w jidysz stworzyła ona system, w którym sztuka jawi się jako poetycko-programowa reakcja na rzeczywistość. Jest ona elitarna, ale też ściśle związana z codziennością. Jest niezbędna dla życia, ale też jest „samym życiem”, w sensie banalnej i wiecznej ballady. Za tą konstrukcją myślową kryje się malarstwo Marca Chagalla. To na przykładzie jego obrazów Vogel dowodzi głównej tezy awangardy o jedności formy i (...) treści. Na tożsamość życia i sztuki Vogel spogląda przez pryzmat aktualności rozumianej nie jako manifestowanie poglądów politycznych, lecz jako konstruowanie rzeczywistości w dziele sztuki. Punktem wyjścia jest dla lwowskiej intelektualistki estetyka Hegla, od której stopniowo przesuwa się ku dialektyce materialistycznej, rozwijając m. in. tezy Lu Märten, pionierki estetyki marksistowskiej. Poetyka życia oraz koncepcje sztuki były u Vogel szeroko zakorzenione w filozofii, m.in. w teorii subiektywnego postrzegania Jakoba von Uexkülla. W artykule omówiona zostaje jego koncepcja koła funkcjonalnego, jak i mająca duży wpływ na artystów awangardowych teza, iż rzeczywistość stanowi dla indywiduum wyłącznie konstrukcję własnych doznań zmysłowych. Na koniec stawiane są pytania dotyczące znaczenia myśli Bergsona i Simmla dla rozumienia sztuki w ujęciu proponowanym przez Deborę Vogel. (shrink)

I critically discuss the contextualist approach to essentialism, which was developed as an explanation of the seeming inconstancy of our essentialist intuitions. The problem is supposed to be that we vacillate a great deal in judging what properties an object has essentially from one occasion to another, which obviously undermines the reliability of our essentialist intuitions. Contextualists solve the problem by combining the metaphysical view that objects have essential properties with the semantic thesis that the term “essentially” is a context (...) sensitive expression. Once we are aware of the context shifting, the conflict of intuitions turns out to be onlyapparent. My aim is to show that contextualism is not the answer that a proponent of essentialism should adopt. First, I outline the contextualist strategy and argue by help of an example that our linguistic practice does not seem to support the contextualist claim that “essentially” is a context-sensitive term. Secondly, the contextualist strategy deals only with the vacillation of intuitions in one person, but offers a very unfavorable explanation of the conflict of intuitions among different persons. Thus, contextualists face the challenge of proving the reliability of essentialist intuitions nevertheless. I conclude with David Lewis’s proposal in order to illustrate that the contextualist approach only provides the appearance, but not the real essentialism. (shrink)

I provide some considerations on scientific thought experiments, focusing on their epistemic value. First, I outline the distinctive features of scientific thought experiments, provide some historical background and, as an illustration, describe two thought experiments: Galileo's on falling bodies and Stevin's on inclined plane. I take thought experiments in physics as an example from which more general conclusions can be drawn - about thought experiments in other natural sciences, but also in philosophy, mathematics, and other sciences. Further, I present Kuhn's (...) epistemic puzzle as well as some proposed solutions. This closely relates to the question what kind of processes are involved in scientific thought experimenting. The satisfactory answer must consider scientific discoveries. I outline the mental model account as the most promising account since it best incorporates the findings of cognitive science. I conclude with two issues that the account needs to resolve and the role cognitive science can play in this. (shrink)